All major U.S. carriers subcontract portions of their networks to regional partners who may either be owned or governed with contracts. Beginning in the late 1990s, there is a change in the nature of contracts in this industry, with fixed price contracts replacing revenue sharing contracts as the predominant contractual form. Moreover, this change is correlated with the diffusion of a new aircraft technology, the regional jet (RJ). To explain this correlation, we investigate whether technological features of the RJ led majors to subcontract new types of flights to their regionals and whether these new flights had characteristics that favored the new contractual form. In particular, we argue that, in addition to the standard insurance/incentives tradeoff, there may be a second advantage to fixed price contracts in this setting as they eliminate the haggling over route selection that can arise under revenue sharing. Combining detailed data on RJ adoption with a novel dataset on contractual form, we show that the emergence of the new technology did result in regionals being used in new ways -for example, serving long, thin spokes and supplementing or replacing the major's own flights. We then investigate whether these new uses are consistent with a change in the optimal contract and find that they are. Specifically, relative to turboprops, RJs were more likely to serve to serve flights whose characteristics suggested that the standalone revenue of the flight might provide limited incentives for a regional to operate that flight.
I. Introduction
All major U.S. network carriers subcontract portions of their network to smaller regional airlines.
In some cases, these regionals are owned by the major for whom they operate while, in other cases, they are independent and governed with contracts. Beginning in the late 1990s, there is a change in the predominant form of contract used in this industry. Revenue sharing contracts -under which the major and regional share ticket revenue from passengers who travel on both carriers -start to be replaced with what are known as "capacity purchase agreements". These are a form of fixed price contract under which the regional receives a fixed amount per flight while the major retains all ticket revenue. Between 1996 and 2003, the percentage of flights by independent regionals which were governed by capacity purchase contracts increased from 15% to 85%.
While this change is, on its own, interesting, what is perhaps even more interesting is the fact that it coincided with the adoption and diffusion of a new aircraft technology, the regional jet (RJ). The RJ is a small jet-powered aircraft with a range of approximately 1000 to 1800 miles, depending on the model type. RJs diffused rapidly during the late 1990s and early 2000s and, by 2003, RJs accounted for over 60% of all regional flights. Newly negotiated capacity purchase contracts disproportionately covered regionals that operated RJs. By 2001, all RJ flights operated by an independent regional were governed by a capacity purchase contract while about 50% of turboprop flights remained under revenue sharing.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between technology adoption and contractual form in this industry. Assuming that firms optimally match contractual form to transaction characteristics, the observed change in contractual form and its coincidence with the adoption of the RJ suggests that RJs may have changed (or been correlated with changes in) the characteristics of the flights being subcontracted to regionals.
1 RJs offered majors a unique bundle of attributes as they combined the capacity of a large turboprop with the speed and range of a jet. The availability of a small plane that could fly relatively long distances and that was fast and comfortable enough to be used on routes of several hours meant that majors could use their regionals in ways that might not have been profitable or possible when only turboprops were available. Indeed, the fact that more than half of the RJs introduced during our sample were adopted on routes that were not previously being served by regionals suggests that this new technology is likely to have changed the types of transactions being carried out by regional airlines.
To understand why this could result in a change in the optimal contractual form, we analyze the tradeoffs that majors face when choosing between revenue sharing and capacity purchase contracts.
Revenue sharing contracts incentivize a regional to exert effort to increase demand, but expose it to risk. Capacity purchase contracts insulate the regional from demand and (most) cost risk but provide limited incentives. In addition to this standard incentives-insurance tradeoff 2 , a second tradeoff arises in this setting resulting from the fact that the regional's and major's flights are integrated into a common network. Because there are externalities across flights, the standalone profitability of a regional's flight will differ from the contribution of that flight to the overall profitability of the major's network. If a regional is compensated with a portion of flight-level revenue, this can lead to haggling between the major and regional over route selection and scheduling decisions. Capacity purchase contracts will reduce this haggling because they make a regional indifferent as to where and when it operates its capacity. If the use of RJs changed either of these tradeoffs, this could explain the correlation between technology adoption and contractual form in this setting.
To investigate this, we collected data on the type of contract that governed almost every partnership between a major U.S. carrier and an independent regional between 1996 and the second quarter of 2003. We combine this with detailed flight-level data which allow us to measure RJ adoption at the flight-quarter level. Our empirical approach implicitly assumes that carriers make decisions about where to deploy RJs based on technological characteristics (i.e.: characteristics that influence the profitability of adopting an RJ on particular flight from a technological perspective) and then choose the contractual form to govern their RJ flights based on incentive characteristics (i.e.:
characteristics that influence the costs and benefits of the two contractual forms). Our main specifications estimate multinomial logit models that relate a major's choice of aircraft type (jet, RJ or turboprop) to route characteristics that affect the relative profitability of serving that route with a particular aircraft type. The results of this analysis indicate that routes served with RJs were in fact systematically different than the routes that regionals had been serving with turboprops. We find that, relative to turboprops, RJs are more likely to be used on longer routes, less likely to be used on tourist oriented routes, more likely to be used on routes that involve congested airports, and much more likely to be used on routes that connect to the major's hub. They are also more likely than turboprops to face competition from low-cost carriers.
We then investigate whether the new uses of RJs might explain why capacity purchase contracts replaced revenue sharing as the preferred contractual form. We identify characteristics that proxy for the tradeoffs related to the two contractual forms and examine differences in these over time and across turboprop and RJ flights. Specifically, we look at the likelihood that a regional flight connects to an endpoint at which the major itself operates flights since we expect that this increases the major's ability to monitor the regional. We also look at several proxies for the existence and magnitude of externalities across flights. We find large and statistically significant differences between turboprop and RJ flights on all of these dimensions. Overall, the patterns are quite consistent with RJs changing the characteristics of the transactions being carried out by regionals in a way that favors the use of capacity purchase contracts to incentivize regionals to serve routes that might not be desirable under revenue sharing.
This paper is related to the empirical literature that analyzes variation in contractual forms. 3 This literature includes papers such as Crocker and Reynolds (1993) , Banerjee and Duflo (2000) , Bajari and Tadelis (2001) , Corts and Singh (2004) and Kalnins and Mayer (2004) -all of which consider the choice between fixed-price and cost-plus contracts. 4 These papers generally analyze the tradeoff between the stronger incentives for cost reduction provided by a fixed price contract and the reduced transaction costs and increased flexibility provided by a cost-plus contract. A second set of papers analyzes the choice between fixed payment and revenue (or profit) sharing contracts. This literature, which includes many applications from franchising and sharecropping, generally focuses on risk sharing and incentive provision. See, for example, see Lafontaine (1992) , Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) and Brickley (2002) on franchising and Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and numerous cites within on sharecropping.
We contribute to this literature in several ways. First, we emphasize a novel source of transactions costs that may arise when revenue sharing contracts are used to govern outsourcing relationships in network industries. The franchising literature has long recognized that, if there are spillovers across units, revenue sharing contracts will provide franchisees with suboptimal incentives for effort. However, in our setting, the existence of externalities from the regional's flights to the rest of the major's network implies that flight-level revenue sharing contracts may not only provide suboptimal incentives for effort but they may not even satisfy the regional's participation constraint.
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Second, the franchising literature, as well as Nickerson and Silverman (2003) , note that, in the presence of significant externalities, company ownership by may be the optimal organizational form, However, in our setting, majors have found a contractual form that provides some the benefits of ownership -specifically, eliminating haggling over route selection and other scheduling decisionsbut without the costs associated with ownership of a regional. As we discuss at length in Forbes and Lederman (2009) , institutional features of this industry create costs of owning regionals resulting from the difficulty of managing two distinct labor forces in a single organization.
Finally, this paper sheds light on one way in which technology adoption may be correlated with organizational forms and thus builds on the work in Baker and Hubbard (2003) and (2004) which estimate the relationship between the adoption of on-board computers and governance decisions in the U.S. trucking industry. In their setting, the relationship between technology adoption and governance decision arises because the new technology changes the contracting environment by lowering monitoring and coordination costs. We demonstrate an alternate channel through which technology adoption can influence organizational decisions -namely, by changing the types of transactions that can be contracted out.
In addition to the empirical contracting literature, this paper is also related to the literature on the economics of technology adoption (see Stoneman, 2002) as well as Brueckner and Pai (2009) , which studies the impact of RJs on airline service patterns. That paper estimates whether RJs allowed airlines to offer point-to-point service in markets in which such service would not have been economical with full-size jets. While they do not find evidence that RJs served this role, they do find patterns of RJ usage that are consistent with what we observe in our data (which comes from a different source). Their results indicate that, rather than expand into new point-to-point markets, RJs were primarily used by majors to provide service on new hub-and-spoke routes, to replace or supplement jet service on existing hub-and-spoke routes and to replace turboprop service on existing hub-and-spoke routes. While the results in that paper indirectly show that RJs allowed majors to use their regionals for flights that they had not previously been serving with turboprops, the paper does not at all consider the interaction of the RJ with airlines' organizational decisions and is also limited to four of the six major airlines that we study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides relevant institutional background. Section III discusses incentives and contracts. Section IV describes our empirical approach and Section V describes our data and variables. We present our results in VI and follow that with a brief conclusion.
II. Institutional Background

A. Regional Airlines 6
Regional airlines operate as subcontractors for major U.S. network carriers on low density short and medium-haul routes. 7 These are routes which are most efficiently served with small aircraft. Majors subcontract these routes to regional airlines because regionals have a cost advantage in operating small planes, resulting from the substantially lower compensation that regional airline employees receive, relative to the major's own employees. 8 In fact, major network carriers do not operate any small aircraft themselves. Thus, a major's decision whether to use a regional to serve a particular flight is effectively a decision about the type of plane to use for that flight.
6 See Forbes and Lederman (2007) and (2009) for more on the role of regional airlines. 7 Examples of such routes include Boston to Burlington, VT, or New York City to Albany, NY. 8 Forbes and Lederman (2009 and forthcoming) provide more detail on the source and magnitude of these labor costs differences.
Regionals generally operate for majors under "codeshare agreements". Under these agreements, the regional operates flights on behalf of the major carrier, who markets and tickets the flights under its own flight designator code. In addition to using the major's code, the regional's flights also share the major's brand. For example, Delta's regional Comair operates under the name Delta Connection. Tickets on Comair's flights are sold by Delta through the same channels that Delta sells its own tickets. Comair's Delta Connection flights utilize Delta's trademarks and logos. To facilitate passenger connections between a major and its regional, their schedules, as well as check-in and baggage handling, may be coordinated.
Over the past 10 to 15 years, regional airlines have come to play an increasingly large role in the U.S. commercial airline industry. In 2008, regional airlines carried about one in every four domestic passengers. Between 1999 and 2008, the number of passengers enplaned by regional airlines more than doubled and the number of available seat miles on regional carriers more than tripled. 9 Much of this growth can be attributed to the adoption and diffusion of the RJ. 10 RJs are appealing because they combine capacity levels previously only available on turboprop planes with the range and speed of larger jets. RJs have become the dominant form of aircraft operated by regional airlines.
B. Organizational Forms and Contracts
Codeshare relationships between majors and regionals are governed in one of two ways.
Regionals are either wholly owned by the major with whom they partner (in which case, they do not generally contract with competing majors) or they are independently owned and work under contract 9 Source: Regional Airline Association (www.raa.org) 10 RJs were first introduced in Europe at the end of 1992 by Lufthansa Cityline and in the U.S. in early 1993 by Comair, a regional partner of Delta Air Lines. The introduction turned out to be a commercial success for both airlines, and these and other airlines followed in adopting the RJ for many of their routes over the following years. RJs range in size from a capacity of 30 passengers to a capacity of 100 passengers in the most recent models.
for one or more major carriers. As mentioned above, starting in the late 1990s, there has been a change in the predominant form of contract used to govern relationships between majors and independent regionals. While our previous work has analyzed differences between owned and independent regionals, the current paper focuses on this change in contractual form.
Historically, contracts between majors and regionals took the form of revenue sharing agreements under which the major and the regional shared the revenue from passengers whose itineraries involved travel on both airlines. Passengers' fares would be split between the two carriers, typically based on the distance traveled on each airline. The regional would receive 100 percent of the revenue of passengers that travelled only its planes. Beginning in the late 1990s, majors and regionals have increasingly used what are known as capacity purchase agreements. Under these agreements, the major pays the regional a fixed amount to cover the regional's operating costs on a block-hour or flight-hour basis. 11 All scheduling, pricing, reservations and marketing are carried out by the major. Under a capacity purchase agreement, the major carrier is effectively purchasing (or renting) the use of the regional's aircraft and flight crews.
Capacity purchase agreements usually take one of two forms. Cost-based contracts explicitly compensate the regional for specific costs it incurs as well as provide it with a profit margin. Costs that are thought to be under the control of the regional (e.g. crew wages) are compensated at a fixed rate that is set ex ante. Costs that are thought to be outside the control of the regional's control (e.g. fuel and landing fees) are fully reimbursed by the major. Cost-based contracts also include a profit component based on the operational performance of the regional. Fee-for-departure contracts compensate the regional a fixed amount per departure. The rate is set to cover all of the regional's 11 Block time is calculated as the time between the start of the engines at the departure airport and the shut off of the engines at the arrival airport. Flight time is calculated as the time between takeoff and landing. Thus, block time includes taxi-out and taxi-in time.
costs and provide it with a profit margin. 12 These contracts will usually also include incentive payments based on operational performance, passenger volumes and/or customer service. Table 1 summarizes the main differences between revenue sharing and capacity purchase contracts. and the number of distinct routes served by regionals increased by more than 50%. Regional flights as a fraction of majors' total domestic flights also increased, from 46% to 58%. Since much of the growth in regional service has come through larger aircraft flying longer distances, the growth in passengers and available seat miles has been even greater with increases of 83% and 146%, respectively, between 1996 and 2003.
C. Changes in Organizational Forms and Technology
Panel B shows changes in the distribution of regional flights across organizational forms. The fraction of regional flights operated by independent regionals decreases over the first few years and then increases slightly. These changes correspond to a small number of ownership changesspecifically, Delta's acquisition of two of its regional partners (Comair and ASA) in 1999 and 2000
12 Fee-for-departure contracts may be either annual or long term. It is our understanding that long term contracts may be adjusted annually to account for changes in operating costs. 13 Our empirical analysis focuses on the period 1996 to the first quarter of 2001 to exclude the industry downturn that began in the middle of 2001. However, for the purposes of illustrating changes over time, our descriptive tables present data through the second quarter of 2003. 14 We exclude TWA from our analysis because it was acquired by American during the sample period. 15 We provide details about our data sources in Section IV below. Looking only at independent regionals (the final two rows of the table), it is apparent that while the very early RJs were governed by revenue-sharing agreements, the industry quickly moved towards capacity purchase and, by 2001, every independent regional flying RJs was doing so under a capacity purchase agreement. Thus, revealed preference suggests that majors perceived capacity purchase agreements to be the optimal way to govern relationships with regionals operating RJs.
Over time, turboprop flights also become increasingly likely to be governed under capacity purchase but not to the same degree.
16 Figure 1 shows changes over time in the number of flights under each organizational/contractual form. 17 Differences in the timing of adoption of RJs across majors are largely driven by differences in "scope clauses" which are limitations imposed by their mainline pilots (in their contract negotiations) on the major's ability to adopt RJs. Table 3 provides a sense of the changes that occurred at the partnership level. We observe two existing revenue sharing relationships that are renegotiated as capacity purchase agreements, three new capacity purchase agreements for entirely new partnerships and three new capacity purchase agreements that cover the RJ flights of existing regional partners who had been (and continue to be)
operating turboprops under revenue sharing. 18 There are several interesting things to note from Table   3 . First, all of the new or renegotiated capacity purchase agreements covered operators of RJs (though in one case, the regional did not begin operating RJs until several years after the contract began). Second, all of the affected regionals increased their fraction of flights by RJs between the start of the agreement and the end of the sample. Third, in the case of three of US Airways' regional partners, the new agreements explicitly covered only RJs while the turboprops remained under revenue sharing. Finally, it is worth pointing out that never, in our sample, do we observe a turboprop-only relationship that is governed by a capacity purchase agreement and even those turboprop relationships that are initiated or renegotiated during our sample are done so under revenue sharing. Table 4 provides a sense of how RJs were used during this period. We identify introductions of
D. RJ Usage
RJs by majors to routes on which we do not previously observe them using RJs. RJs that are in use in the first quarter of our sample are excluded. We distinguish four different uses for RJs: (1) replacing or supplementing existing turboprop service; (2) replacing or supplementing existing jet service; (3) entry into new routes; and (4) replacing turboprops or jets on routes previously served with a combination of jets and turboprops. The table shows the distribution of RJ introductions across these 18 As the bottom of the table indicates, some of the reduction in revenue sharing flights comes from three acquisitions of independent regionals that had previously been operating under revenue sharing contracts. 
III. Incentives and Contracts
In this section, we explain how the two contractual forms address incentive problems that may exist in the relationship between majors and regionals. 20 Outsourcing arrangements such as these can be thought of as principal-agent relationships in which the agent (here, the regional) will exert suboptimal effort unless the principal uses incentive contracts or monitoring to get the agent to (or close to) the optimal effort level. 21 The set of activities allocated to the regional will vary both across partnerships as well as across airports, even for a given partnership. The regional will always be responsible for activities related to the operation of the aircraft including in-flight service and will usually also be responsible for activities related to the on-time departure and arrival of an aircraft, such as loading/unloading of baggage. 22 Depending on the size of the major's own operations at the airport, the regional may also carry out other activities such as check-in and ticket sales.
While the operation of the aircraft is tightly regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration (and, thus, will likely not require additional monitoring), the quality of in-flight service is one of the dimensions that we expect will be difficult for the major to monitor. However, the decisions by most U.S. airlines in recent years to significantly reduce in-flight service compared to previous levels suggest that it has a relatively weak effect on demand (compared to factors such as scheduling, ontime performance and frequent flier affiliation). This leads us to believe that providing incentives for in-flight service is unlikely to be a major driver of the choice between revenue sharing and capacity purchase contracts. Quality dimensions such as on-time performance and baggage handling continue to be important determinants of demand; however, relative to effort on in-flight service, the regional's effort on on-time performance may be easier for the major to monitor (since the leading cause of delays outside an airline's control is weather which is observable). Consistent with this, we observe that capacity purchase contracts often include incentive payments based on metrics such as on-time performance, completion factors and lost baggage. Finally, for other tasks that regionals may perform at certain airports -check-in, ticketing and other customer service functions -effort is likely hard to measure and we expect that the major's ability to monitor effort on these types of tasks will depends on the major's own presence at the airport.
23 22 We believe that regionals are always responsible for the maintenance of their aircraft. Maintenance is tightly regulated by the FAA. 23 It is worth noting that while revenue sharing contracts provide the regionals with greater incentives to exert effort to increase demand than capacity purchase contracts, these incentives are suboptimal. This is not only because the regional only captures a portion of the revenue generated by the (connecting) passengers it carries but also because the regional, like a franchisee, will not internalize the impact that its effort has on demand elsewhere in the major's network.
In addition to the standard insurance-incentives tradeoff, in our setting there is a second tradeoff between the two contractual forms relating to haggling between the major and regional over route selection and scheduling. Under a revenue-sharing contract, a regional will prefer to serve the flights with the greatest stand-alone profitability. However, because of the externalities across flights, the overall contribution of a flight to the profitability of the major's network -which is what the major bases its scheduling decision on -can differ significantly from the standalone profitability of the flight. For example, the fact that an airline offers a 2 pm flight on a given route may increase consumers' willingness-to-pay for the airline's 5 pm flight because it gives consumers the option of taking an earlier flight if their travel plans change unexpectedly (see, for example, Berry and Jia, 2010) but, on a typical day, the 2 pm flight may be quite empty. This can lead to haggling if regionals are compensated with a portion of flight-level revenue. In contrast, under a capacity purchase contract, a regional's payment does not depend on flight-level revenues and, in fact, the contract is structured to make the regional indifferent between where and when it operates its capacity. This eliminates disagreement over scheduling decisions and, consistent with this, the capacity purchase contracts that we have been able to look at explicitly give the major complete control over the scheduling and inventory decisions for the regional.
It is interesting to note that in trade press articles as well as in the interviews that we conducted, industry participants acknowledge the tradeoffs discussed above. In describing the renegotiating of United Airlines and Atlantic Coast Airlines' revenue sharing contract as capacity purchase, an article from Air Transport in 2000 highlights the greater control that these contracts provide to the major, stating that "the new pay scheme assures a better revenue stream for ACA and will mitigate earnings volatility due to external factors such as fuel prices and passenger yields. In exchange, United assumes complete control of seat inventory, fares, scheduling and selection of destinations. Possible plans to enhance ACA's small hub operation at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport will be made solely by United, if at all."
In our interview of the CEO of one of the largest regional carriers, he touched on precisely the haggling issue described above, stating that "the mainline is managing its overall network and doesn't want the regional complaining about the routes it is serving" and that "there are elements of the network that are going to be sub-optimized in the interests of the overall network". Interestingly, none of the trade press sources we collected, nor any of the interviewees, identified the loss of incentives provided by revenue sharing as a salient issue. This may be because the incentive clauses based on observable metrics like on-time performance that are included in capacity purchase contracts are effective or because competition between independent regionals and the ease of switching regionals act to discipline regionals. Finally, when we asked industry participants (such as consultants and reporters who specialize in the regional airline industry) why the change in contractual form coincided with the adoption of the RJ, one individual told us it was because RJs allowed regionals to serve "larger, denser markets" that were "more like mainline fights" while another attributed the fact that "RJs act more as replacement for mainline flying".
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IV. Empirical Approach
Our empirical analysis investigates the effect of route -level characteristics on RJ adoption.
Our regression analysis focuses on what we call technological characteristics, such as distance and measures of route density, which we believe are the primary determinants of the choice to introduce an RJ on a given route. 25 In our main specifications, we estimate multinomial logit models of the choice between the three different plane types: turboprops, RJs and jets. We also estimate hazard models of the RJ adoption decision for two subsamples: routes that had only turboprop service and routes that had only jet service at the beginning of our sample, respectively. In our main regressions, we pool flights by independent and by wholly-owned regionals. We do this because we believe that the deployment of RJs is mainly driven by technological considerations and less so by restrictions that might be imposed by the regional's ownership status. However, we include a robustness check in which we estimate RJ adoption patterns separately for independent and owned regionals. We find that these patterns are very similar.
After demonstrating in these regressions that the introduction of the RJ expanded regional service into a new and different set of routes, we analyze whether it also changed what we call the incentive characteristics of routes served by independent regionals. Building on the discussion in Section III, we identify flight and route characteristics that proxy for the two tradeoffs that majors face when choosing between revenue sharing and capacity purchase contracts. We then investigate whether the expansion of regional service due to the technological characteristics of the RJ resulted in regionals carrying out transactions whose incentive characteristics are consistent with capacity purchase agreements replacing revenue sharing as the optimal contractual form.
While we compare the incentive characteristics of the new regional routes to the old ones descriptively, for several reasons, we choose not to follow the standard approach in this literature of estimating a model of contract choice. First, as we show in Section II.C above, there is a very close correlation between RJ adoption and the switch to fixed fee contracts, suggesting that the new technology prompted the contract change. Second, in contrast to most previous studies, the relevant variation in contractual form here arises over time rather than cross-sectionally. Given this, rather than simply relate the variation in contractual form to changes in transaction characteristics, we exploit the fact that our data allows to observe the diffusion of the RJ and thus to document the source of the variation in transaction characteristics. Third, whereas the choice of technology is made at the flight level and therefore lends itself to a large-scale regression analysis, the choice of contractual form governs all flights of a given partnership (or, occasionally, there is one choice for all of the partnership's turboprop flights, and another choice for all RJ flights). This not only leads to fewer observations, but implies that the contract choice decision is based on some aggregation of flight characteristics. Since we do not know which aggregation mechanism the airlines use when solving this optimization problem, any regression analysis of this problem would likely be biased.
V. Data and Variables
Our analysis combines several sources of data. Our first source of data is the Official Airlines Guide (OAG). The OAG data contains the complete flight schedule for all domestic airlines. Each observation in this data corresponds to particular flight by an airline on a day and includes information on the ticketing and operating carriers, the origin and destination airports, the scheduled departure and arrival times, and the aircraft type. These data allow us to identify -for each flightwhether it was operated by a regional and, if so, which regional. They also allow us to identify the exact type of aircraft used for the flight which we can then categorize as a turboprop, RJ or mainline jet. We also use the OAG data to construct various flight and route level characteristics. Our OAG data is at the quarterly level and covers the first quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 2003 inclusive.
For each year in our sample, we have assembled data on whether or not each of a major's regional partners are owned by that major and, for regionals that are not owned, whether they operated under a revenue sharing or capacity purchase agreement. The data on ownership were obtained from the Regional Airline Association. There is no systematic source of data on contractual form for independent regionals and so we hand-collected this data using sources such as industry trade presses, annual reports of the majors and of publicly traded regionals, various types of SEC filings, and press releases. The resulting data cover over 80 percent of the partnerships with independent regionals that we observe. For new relationships or new contracts, we generally have the month and year that these contracts came into effect. Where possible, we checked for consistency across different sources and also checked for consistency with what we observed in the OAG data.
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The sample used for our technology adoption regressions is created in the following way: we start with all flights within the continental U.S. operated by the six largest network carriers (American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United and US Airways) or by any of their regional partners who operate under a codeshare agreement that involves sharing of the major's brand. 27 We keep a typical weekday schedule. 28 We then drop routes with distances of more than 1300 miles because these are outside the range of RJs (as we observe it for our sample) and would thus automatically have to be served by jets. 29 We also drop flights to and from LaGuardia Airport in This is because, in the spring of 2001, airlines started to substantially reduce their overall capacity following the start of the recession, and this trend was dramatically amplified in the aftermath of 26 We encountered one difficulty in matching the ownership and contract data to the OAG data. For reasons unknown to us, in the first three years of our data, the OAG gives all of US Airways' regionals the same code ("USE" for US Airways Express). Therefore, we are unable to distinguish the multiple regionals that operate under the US Airways Express name and match them to their ownership/contract information. 27 This means we exclude relationships where they codeshare but the regional keeps its own brand. For example, some majors codeshare with American Eagle but they simply sell tickets on American Eagle planes under their code. American Eagle does not take on their brand for these flights. We exclude relationships such as these. 28 We keep Monday flights. More than 99 percent of these flights also operate on Tuesday through Friday. 29 We impose a minimum distance of 25 miles. 30 See Forbes (2008) for more detail.
September 11, 2001. As Table 4 indicates, the industry downturn affected the ways in which RJs were deployed, increasing the frequency of RJs being used to reduce capacity on routes formerly served by jets. Furthermore, since the change to capacity purchase as the dominant contractual form for RJ operators was virtually complete by the start of 2001, we want to relate this change to the uses of RJs that the majors were likely to have anticipated when they negotiated these contracts and not those uses that emerged when the industry contracted. explain airlines' choice of aircraft type at the flight level. We construct a measure of the distance of a route in miles and expect that longer routes are more likely to be served by RJs than turboprops but even more likely to be served by jets. The mean distance in our sample is 418 miles. To proxy for route density, which should influence the optimal choice of plane size, we use U.S. Census data at the MSA-level to construct the population of each endpoint. In our sample, the mean population of the larger and smaller endpoints is 6.9 million and 2.2 million, respectively. To capture routes on which there is a taste for high frequency, we define "shuttle routes" as routes with 15 or more departures by the airline in the same direction per day. We define "tourist routes" as routes with at least one endpoint for which the ratio of MSA-level hotel revenues to manufacturing sales is 0.04 or greater.
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Because the speed, comfort and frequency benefits of RJs are likely to be less highly valued by tourist travelers than business travelers, we expect that tourist routes will have a lower probability of 31 These endpoints are primarily located in Florida, Nevada and coastal California.
being served by RJs. 32 We define "hub routes" as routes which have at least one endpoint that is the carrier's own hub. Although there was initially much speculation that RJs would be used to bypass hubs and provide more point-to-point service, consistent with Bruckner and Pai (2009), our results
show that hub routes have a higher probability of being served by RJs than non-hub routes.
The decision to substitute RJs for smaller turboprops or larger jets is likely to be influenced by the degree of congestion at the endpoint airports of a flight. In order to define a measure of airport congestion, we compute the number of daily departures per runway at each endpoint and take the maximum of that across the two endpoints. 33 We use the maximum because we believe that, all else equal, the more congested endpoint is more likely to influence how an airline trades off aircraft size and flight frequency. We expect that routes that involve a more congested airport favor the use of aircraft with larger seat capacity (i.e. jets over RJs and turboprops but also RJs relative to turboprops).
Finally, we construct measures of competition from low-cost carriers. Because regionals provide majors with access to substantially lower labor costs, majors may have used RJs to compete with low-cost carriers. We construct a dummy variable that equals one if a route has direct competition from a low-cost carrier. For routes that connect a spoke to a hub, competition at the smaller endpoint (to other hubs) may be more relevant than competition on the route and so we also construct a measure of whether there is LCC competition at the smaller endpoint of a route. During our sample, 27 percent of all routes have competition from a low-cost carrier on the route and 64 percent have a low-cost carrier that serves the smaller endpoint. 34 We also control for the total number of competitors on the route and the total number of competitor serving the smaller endpoint. 32 We attempted to construct a measure of routes that involve significant business travel. However, most of the endpoint airports that are associated with business travel are also hubs. This prevented us from identifying a business travel effect separately from the hub effect. 33 We only consider parallel runways. 34 Our group of low-cost carriers includes Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Frontier Airlines, Midwest Express, AirTran Airways, American Trans Air, Vanguard Airlines, Sun Country Airlines, Spirit Airlines, and ValuJet Airlines. We define low-cost carrier competition at the city level, including service to and from secondary airports in the same city. Table 6 shows multinomial logit estimates of the factors affecting an airline's choice to operate a given flight with a jet, RJ, or turboprop. We define turboprops as the base category. The coefficients are presented as relative risk ratios, or odds ratios, and standard errors are clustered at the carrier level. Specifications (1) through (3) include flights on all routes, while specification (4) includes only flights on routes that are newly entered by a carrier during our sample and is restricted to the first quarter of entry to the new route. We begin in specification (1) with our pure technology measures and then in specifications (2) and (3) add measures of route-level competition and endpointlevel competition, respectively.
VI. Results
A. Technology Regressions
The coefficients on the year dummies capture the diffusion process of RJs. They indicate that, relative to turboprops and jets, the likelihood of observing flights operated by RJs increases over time. The coefficients on the distance variable indicate that both jets and RJs are more likely to serve longer routes than turboprops with the effect being larger for jets. The odds ratios of 2.6 and 2.1, respectively, mean that, as a flight's distance increases by 100 miles, it becomes 2.6 times more likely to be served with a jet and 2.1 times more likely to be served with an RJ, relative to a turboprop.
Increasing the population of the larger endpoint lowers the likelihood of observing both jets and RJs relative to turboprops. Increasing the population of the smaller endpoint increases the likelihood of observing jets. In other words, jets are more likely to serve routes with more potential traffic between the endpoints than RJs and turboprops are.
We find that shuttle routes are much less likely to be served with RJs than with either jets or turboprops indicating that serving these types of very high frequency routes was not one of the ways in which majors used RJs. The ratio of RJs to turboprops is lower on tourist routes than business routes. This is consistent with the speed and comfort advantages of RJs being more highly valued by business travelers. Whether or not a route connects to a hub has a very large effect on the type of aircraft chosen. Jets are 3.6 times more likely to serve hub routes than turboprops are, and RJs are almost 4 times more likely than turboprops to serve hub routes. As expected, jets and RJs are also more likely to serve flights that involve a more congested endpoint airport, as measured by the number of daily departures per runway.
Overall, these results show that jets serve the longest and densest routes, while RJs serve long thin routes. Furthermore, most jet and RJ flights go to and from hubs. 35 Turboprops serve shorter and thinner routes, with one exception: during our sample period, they are frequently employed for shuttle routes that were too short or not dense enough to be economical for jet service, such as San Diego-Los Angeles or Boston-New York (JFK). This shuttle effect also partly explains why we find that the larger endpoint of the turboprop routes tends to be very large because a significant fraction of turboprop flights goes to New York or Los Angeles, the MSAs with the largest populations. In addition, many other turboprop flights connect small communities to very large cities, whereas there is little turboprop service between mid-sized communities.
The second specification in Table 6 adds controls for route-level competition. We find that jets are most likely to serve routes with competition from low-cost carriers, followed by RJs. The effects are quite large with odds ratios of 2.8 and 1.9, respectively; however, the effect is not statistically significant for RJs. Since competition on the route may be endogenous, we interpret these coefficients as being consistent with majors using RJs to compete with low-cost carriers but do not rule out the presence of unobservables that could lead both RJs and LCCs to serve the same types of routes. However, as we will discuss below, regardless of the direction of the causality, the presence of low-cost carries on routes served by RJs may affect the incentives of regionals to operate these flights if they are compensated with revenue sharing. The overall number of competitors on the same route has no significant effect on the choice of plane type. The effects on the other control variables are as in specification (1).
In specification (3), we show the effects of alternate measures of route competition. We find that jets, followed by RJs, are more likely to serve routes which have more competitors serving the smaller endpoint. In addition, RJs are more likely than either jets or turboprops to serve routes on which the smaller endpoint has any low-cost carrier service. While these measures of competition have the benefit of being less endogenous than realized competition, they have the drawback of potentially being correlated with route density. This is also likely the reason why the effects of the endpoint population variables are smaller in this specification, compared to specification (1).
Having established the basic relationships between route characteristics and aircraft type, we now attempt to provide a more nuanced sense of these relationships by focusing on various subsamples of our data. We do this because the characteristics that affect the likelihood of RJ adoption could depend on the way in which the RJ is being used. We begin by looking at flights on routes that are newly entered by a carrier during our sample. We estimate the multinomial logit model from specification (2) on a sample that includes only newly entered routes and only in the first quarter of entry. The results are presented in the final column of Table 6 . 36 We find that, for new routes, the effects of route distance are even larger than in the full sample, with odds ratios of 7.6 and 5.4 for jets and RJs, respectively. Routes with LCC service are most likely to be entered with jets, followed by RJs. These effects are very large as well with odds ratios of 136 and 40, respectively.
Most of the other control variables have very noisy coefficients, suggesting that these route 36 We condition on routes that are entered for at least 4 consecutive quarters.
characteristics have a less systematic effect on the choice of plane type for new routes than they had in the full sample. This may be because airlines often experiment with new routes without being certain whether demand is sufficient to justify sustained service. Since new routes are very rarely shuttle routes, we exclude the shuttle variable from this specification.
In Table 7 , we create subsamples based on the type of aircraft that the major had used to serve a route prior to introducing RJs. We create a sample of routes that were served exclusively with turboprops at the beginning of our sample and a subsample of routes that were served exclusively with jets at the beginning of our sample. Since our interest here is the adoption of an RJ on the route, we estimate route-level hazard models. We assume a Weibull distribution and present the resulting hazard ratios in Table 7 . As before, the standard errors are clustered at the carrier level. Our results
here are quite consistent with our earlier findings. Among the routes which were initially served only by turboprops, routes with longer distance, with a hub endpoint, with a more congested endpoint and with low-cost carrier competition are most likely to adopt RJ service. In contrast, among the routes which were initially served only by jets, routes with a greater population at the larger endpoint, routes with a lower population at the smaller endpoint, routes that are not classified as tourist routes and routes with less route-level competition are most likely to adopt RJs. On routes initially served by jets, distance has no significant effect on RJ adoption, but recall that we are limiting our sample to routes of less than 1300 miles (i.e. routes that are short enough for RJ service). Overall, these results clearly suggest that RJs served the purpose of flying on routes with "intermediate" characteristics, between those typical of turboprop routes and of jet routes.
Finally, in Table 8 , we estimate hazard models for regional flights (i.e. all turboprop and RJ flights), separating flights operated by independent regionals and flights operated by regionals that are wholly-owned by the major. We do this in order to investigate whether the patterns of RJ adoption differ importantly for these two groups of regionals. 37 The results suggest that they do not.
Both types of regionals are significantly more likely to introduce RJs on longer routes and on routes with low-cost carrier competition. Hub, congestion and the number of competitors at the endpoint also have a similar effect in both groups. However, the statistical significance of the coefficients on these controls varies. Some differences are apparent for the other variables. Relative to turboprops, independent regionals operate RJs on routes with somewhat smaller endpoint populations and greater tourist orientation while owned regionals tend to operate RJs on routes with larger endpoint populations and similar tourist orientation, compared to their turboprop flights.
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B. Resulting Changes in Transaction Characteristics
In Section III, we identified two tradeoffs that majors face when choosing between a revenue sharing and capacity purchase contract. While revenue sharing contracts provide a regional with incentives to exert effort to increase demand on its flights, they expose the regional to variability in profits and may lead to haggling over route selection by tightly linking the regional's incentive to serve a flight to the standalone revenue of that flight. Having analyzed the technological characteristics that drive RJ adoption, we now investigate whether these technology adoption decisions led to the result that regionals were carrying out a new set of transactions that favored capacity purchase contracts over revenue sharing.
To do so, we identify variables (some of which were included in our earlier regressions) that proxy for either the ease of monitoring or the likelihood that, as a result of externalities elsewhere in the major's network, the regional and major will disagree over the relative desirability of a flight. We 37 We do not include any jet flights in this analysis because several majors own some of their regionals, but not others, so that we cannot clearly group their jet flights with one type of regional or the other. 38 We note that majors with owned regionals were later to adopt RJs and so some of these differences may reflect differences in the stage of the diffusion process.
investigate in Table 9 whether these incentive characteristics are different for flights operated by independent regionals in the first quarter of our sample compared to the flights they operated in the final quarter of our sample. However, since RJs account for only about one fifth of all flights by independent regionals in 2001, the average characteristics of regional routes may not appear that different even if the RJ routes have very different characteristics. Therefore, we also compare the characteristics of turboprop flight and RJ flights in the final quarter of our sample. We observe some changes in the average incentive characteristics of all regional flights over time and large differences in these variables across turboprop and RJ flights.
The first variable we construct is a dummy that equals one for routes on which the major has no flights of its own at the smaller endpoint. We expect that when there is no overlap by the major and regional at the smaller airport, monitoring is more difficult for the major and, all else equal, revenue sharing is more attractive. In addition, at airports at which the major has no flights of its own, the regional will likely be responsible for a greater set of activities and have more interaction with passengers and so its effort may have a larger impact on the major's profits. This may also increase the relative benefits of revenue sharing contracts. We observe that, over time, regional flights become more likely to operate on a route on which the major has no presence at the smaller endpoint but this is driven entirely by turboprop flights. At the end of our sample, 69% of turboprop flights connect to at least one endpoint with no flights by the major while only 40% of RJ flights do.
If overlap by the regional and major at an airport facilitates monitoring, this difference is consistent with the incentive properties of revenue sharing contracts being less important for RJ flights.
We use several variables to proxy for the extent to which a major and regional may haggle over the desirability of a particular flight. We construct a measure of whether a major and regional operate flights on the same route and call this "mixed service". If there are spillovers across flights on the route and, in particular, if the flights operated by the regional have low standalone revenue (for example, if they are at off-peak times of the day and mostly for the purpose of driving demand for the peak time flights), then these flights will not be very desirable to a regional compensated with revenue sharing. We observe no statistically significant difference over time in the probability that a regional flight operates on a mixed route; however, there is a large difference in the share of flights on mixed routes between turboprops and RJs at the end of our sample. This share is three times as large for RJs than it is for turboprops. This reflects the fact that RJs were used to operate some flights on routes that were previously served entirely by jets and that RJs replaced turboprops on routes which previously had mixed service by turboprops and jets. The share of turboprop flights on mixed routes is actually lower in 2001 than at the beginning of the sample.
We also look at whether a regional flight connects to a major's hub. For these flights, the difference between the contribution to the profitability of the major's network and the standalone profitability may be large for two reasons. First, if many of the passengers on the regional connect to flights operated by the major, the major will be able to operate larger planes on the spokes that it serves itself, thus lowering its average cost on these flights (see Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller 1992 , Brueckner and Spiller 1994 , and Berry, Carnall and Spiller, 2006 . However, this will of course not be reflected in the profit that the regional earns from these passengers. Second, as has been well documented by Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein (1991) , airlines benefit, in several ways, from dominating a particular airport -for example, because they may be able to influence the allocation of scarce airport facilities, because they can exploit economies of scale in things like advertising and because airline frequent-flier programs create links between the size of an airline's network an airport and consumers' willingness-to-pay for tickets on any given flight in that network (see Lederman, 2007 , for empirical evidence on this). If so, then hub carriers will have an incentive to offer or maintain service on spoke routes even if those routes are not, on their own, particularly profitable.
Since this effect may be more pronounced at hubs at which there are two dominant carriers, we also look at whether or not a hub route involves an airport that serves as a hub to two majors. Consistent with what we would expect, we observe that, between 1996 and 2001, the fraction of regional flights that involve a hub endpoint increased from 53% to 70%. However, much of this change is driven by RJs, as 85% of RJ flights in the first quarter of 2001 involve a hub endpoint while only 66% of turboprop flights do. The table also indicates that RJs are much more likely than turboprops to serve shared hubs where a major's incentive to maintain unattractive spokes may be greatest.
Finally, all else equal, routes with more competition, especially from low-cost carriers, may be unattractive to regionals compensated under revenue sharing because they provide lower and potentially more variable revenue. However, they may still be attractive to the major if they connect to an important hub, if these routes carry passengers who connect onto high yield routes (for example, long-haul international flights) or if the major, for strategic reasons, does not want to cede the route to a competitor. Therefore, we look at the presence of low-cost carrier competition on the route and, for hub routes, the number of competitors serving the spoke endpoint. We observe that, while there is little change in the average intensity of competition for regional flights overall over this period, there are statistically significant differences for turboprop and RJ flights. In the first quarter of 2001, the share of RJ flights serving routes that face direct competition from at least one low-cost carrier is three times higher than for turboprop flights. RJ flights on hub routes compete with more airlines at the spoke endpoint than do turboprop flights on hub routes. Overall, the patterns in Table 9 suggest that RJs serve routes which would involve significant haggling between the major and regional if revenue sharing contracts were used to govern these transactions. Furthermore, the table also
indicates that the greater overlap between majors and regionals (both on a route and at the endpoint airports) might have improved monitoring for RJ flights.
We conclude this section with a short discussion of turboprop relationships. As Table 2 indicates, turboprop flights also became increasingly likely to be governed by capacity purchase contracts though not to the same degree as RJs. If, as we have hypothesized, the switch to capacity purchase contracts results from regionals using RJs to expand into new routes, this begs the question of why we observe turboprop flights under the new contractual form. A possible explanation for this is that, in all three of the turboprop relationships that are governed by capacity purchase at the end of our sample (Delta and SkyWest, United and SkyWest and United and ACA), the regionals operated both turboprops and RJs for the major and often at the same airport. Specifically, 56% of the turboprop flights operated in these three relationships in the first quarter of 2001 departed from or arrived at an airport at which the regional also operated RJs for the major. 14% of the turboprop flights were on routes on which the regional also operated RJs for the major. Having a regional's turboprop flights operate under revenue sharing while its RJ flights at the same airport or on the same route operate under capacity purchase could create numerous incentive problems. For example, the regional would clearly have an incentive to substitute effort towards increasing demand on the revenue sharing flights at the expense of effort on the capacity purchase flights.
In contrast, regionals that fly only turboprops are never governed by capacity purchase during our sample. US Airways has regionals that fly both turboprops and RJs on its behalf and, unlike the partnerships above, governs its turboprop flights with revenue sharing and its RJ flights with capacity purchase. However, there is significantly less overlap between its turboprop and its RJ flights. In particular, for US Airways' regionals that operate both turboprops and RJs, only 28% of their turboprop flights depart from or arrive at airports at which the regional also operates RJs and they never overlap on the same route.
C. Alternative Explanations
We discuss two possible alternative explanations for the correlation between the adoption of RJs and the switch to capacity purchase contracts. In both explanations, it is the technology itselfas opposed to the way in which the technology is used -which could change the optimal contractual form. First, a correlation between RJ adoption and capacity purchase contracts could arise if RJs themselves improve a major's ability to monitor its regional. While neither the trade presses nor any of our interviewees identified a relationship between plane type and monitoring, one could imagine several channels through which RJs might better allow a major to observe its regional's effort on certain types of tasks. First, by virtue of being newer, RJs might have a lower risk of mechanical problems. Second, because RJs fly at higher altitudes than turboprops, they are less likely to be affected by certain types of bad weather. Both of these factors could reduce the amount of noise in the relationship between regional's effort on on-time performance and realized on-time performance.
On the other hand, it is hard to imagine any channel through which RJs would affect the monitoring of effort on in-flight service or customer service-related activities at an airport. To the extent that RJs do improve monitoring, they could lead majors and regionals to use capacity purchase contracts since incentive provision through revenue sharing would be less important. We view this possible explanation as complementary to the one that we have investigated.
The second alternative explanation relates to financial considerations. The adoption of RJs required regionals to acquire new and more expensive aircraft. In order to take on the debt associated with the new aircraft, regionals may have wanted a less variable revenue stream, and capacity purchase contracts provide this. Alternatively, the new contracts may have been preferred by the lessors of the aircraft. While we cannot rule out this explanation, we note that since the revenue stream from a capacity purchase contract is essentially guaranteed by the majors, they could have presumably found an alternate means to help finance the regionals' aircraft that did not involve a change in incentives.
VII. Conclusion
This paper began with two empirical facts. First, there has been a change in the predominant form of contract used to govern airlines' outsourcing relationships with their regional partners.
Second, this change is highly correlated with the adoption and diffusion of the RJ. Motivated by these facts, we have explored the relationship between technology adoption and contractual form in this setting. The first part of our empirical analysis has shown that, at the flight level, RJ adoption is driven by characteristics that influence whether the flight is well suited for the technological features of an RJ, such as its range and size. The results of our regression analysis suggest that RJs act as a hybrid between turboprops and jets. Relative to turboprops, the routes served by RJs are longer, more likely to connect to a hub, involve airports at which landing slots are in higher demand and less likely to involve tourist endpoints. Relative to jets, the routes served by RJs are thinner but otherwise quite similar. Overall, these results indicate the RJs did result in majors subcontracting new types of routes to their regional partners and indeed the raw data indicate that more than half of the RJs adopted during our sample were placed on routes that were not previously being served by a regional.
The second part of our empirical analysis investigates whether these new uses of regionals are consistent with capacity purchase replacing revenue sharing as the optimal contractual form. Our descriptive analysis suggests that they are. Specifically, the data indicate that, compared to turboprop flights, RJ flights are more likely to involve externalities elsewhere in the major's network and, because of their greater overlap with the major's flights, RJ flights may be easier to monitor. Second, building on our earlier work in this industry, we again highlight transaction costs that can arise when firms operating in a network industry attempt to outsource a portion of their network.
In our previous work, we focus on incentive problems that can arise when contracts are incomplete and majors and regionals haggle over real-time adaptation decisions. Here, we emphasize that the existence of externalities across flights in the major's network can lead to differences between the standalone profitability of a flight and the overall contribution of that flight to the profitability of the major's network. When revenue sharing arrangements are used, this can lead to haggling between majors and regional over route selection and scheduling as the major seeks to optimize its overall network while the regional is concerned only with the set of flights that it operates. Whether or not similar incentive problems may arise when firms outsource in other network industries is a second fruitful avenue for future work. This is also contributes to the increase in CP flights. Table counts introductions of RJs by American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United and US Airways to routes on which they did not previously use a RJ (within our sample). ``TP Replacement or Supplement`` includes RJ introductions to routes that were served exclusively by TPs before RJs are introduced to the route and served either exclusively by RJs or by a combination of RJs and TPs afterwards. ``Jet Replacement or Supplement`` includes RJ introductions to routes that were served exclusively by jets before RJs are introduced to the route and either exclusively by RJs or by a combination of jets and RJs afterwards. ``New Route`` refers to routes that were not previously served (within our sample) by the major with any kind of aircraft (and may be served by RJs exclusively or a combination of RJs and other aircraft) afterwards. "Mixed" refers to RJ introductions to routes that were served by a combination of jets and TPs before RJs are introduced. "Other" includes RJ introductions that do not fit into any of the above categories (for example, an RJ introduction to a route previously served by jets but served by a combination of RJs and TPs in the quarter of RJ introduction). 
